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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from an interlocutory order allowing Appellee to intervene into 
a preservation of assets action brought by the State pursuant to §77-38a-601, Utah Code 
2009. The intervention was granted pursuant to a legal conclusion by the trial court that 
statute's notice requirement violates the due process provisions of the Constitution of 
Utah, and Appellee qualified for intervention by right and permissive intervention, under 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(g). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly address the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 77-38a-601 when it concluded that Section 77-38a-601 violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Utah Constitution by failing to provide notice to persons 
who do not possess a secured interest, lien, title, or other ownership interest in 
property which is subject to an asset protection suit (R. 1771: 22, 20-26,16). 
'"The issue of whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which we 
review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court/ State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, 
f 17, 174 P.3d 628 (quoting Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, «|] 7, 67 P.3d 
436). 'Furthermore, we presume the legislation being challenged is constitutional, and we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality/ Wood, 2002 UT 134, ^ f 7, 67 
P.3d 436." State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ^  9, 233 P.3d 476 (Utah 2010) 
2. Does Appellee have an intervention of right under Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 1771: 39, 8-41,23; 44,15-16.) 
"This court has not heretofore identified the standard it employs when reviewing a 
motion to intervene as of right under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). See Lima v. 
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982) (reversing trial court's denial of intervention but not 
stating standard of review for that reversal). We now adopt a de novo standard of review 
when intervention as of right is before us on appeal." In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 
UT 28, ] 16,1 P.3d 1074 (Utah 2000). 
3. Does Appellee have a permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 1171: 43,10-44,1; 44,15-16.) 
"A trial court's grant of intervention pursuant to rule 24(b) [permissive 
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intervention] involves the discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn its ruling 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. Utah R.Civ.P. 24(b); Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 
11A P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989)." Utah Department of Social Services v. Sucec, 924 
P.2d 882, 887 (Utah 1996), editing added. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to a 
determination of this case: 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I., § 7. Due process of law: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code §77-38a-601. Preservation of assets: 
(1) Prior to or at the time a criminal information, indictment charging a violation, 
or a petition alleging delinquency is filed, or at any time during the prosecution of 
the case, a prosecutor may, if in the prosecutor's best judgment there is a 
substantial likelihood that a conviction will be obtained and restitution will be 
ordered in the case, petition the court to: 
(a) enter a temporary restraining order, an injunction, or both; 
(b) require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond; or 
(c) take any other action to preserve the availability of property which may be 
necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order. 
(2) (a) Upon receiving a request from a prosecutor under Subsection (1), and after 
notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and affording them 
an opportunity to be heard, the court may take action as requested by the 
prosecutor if the court determines: 
(i) there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it, and that failure to enter the order will likely result in the 
property being sold, distributed, exhibited, destroyed, or removed from the 
jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise be made unavailable for restitution; and 
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property or prevent its sale, 
distribution, exhibition, destruction, or removal through the entry of the requested 
order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered. 
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(b) In a hearing conducted pursuant to this section, a court may consider reliable 
hearsay as defined in Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1102. 
(c) An order for an injunction entered under this section is effective for the period 
of time given in the order. 
(3) (a) Upon receiving a request for a temporary restraining order from a 
prosecutor under this section, a court may enter a temporary restraining order 
against an owner with respect to specific property without notice or opportunity for 
a hearing if: 
(i) the prosecutor demonstrates that there is a substantial likelihood that the 
property with respect to which the order is sought appears to be necessary to 
satisfy an anticipated restitution order under this chapter; and 
(ii) provision of notice would jeopardize the availability of the property to satisfy 
any restitution order or judgment. 
(b) The temporary order in this Subsection (3) expires not more than 10 days after 
it is entered unless extended for good cause shown or the party against whom it is 
entered consents to an extension. 
(4) A hearing concerning an order entered under this section shall be held as soon 
as possible, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24. Intervention: 
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to 
intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to 
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; 
or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of 
law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or 
defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a governmental 
officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued 
or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon 
timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its 
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or 
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene 
upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state the grounds therefor 
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and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for 
which intervention is sought. 
(d) Constitutionality of statutes and ordinances. 
(d)(1) If a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute in an action in which 
the Attorney General has not appeared, the party raising the question of 
constitutionality shall notify the Attorney General of such fact. The court shall 
permit the state to be heard upon timely application. 
(d)(2) If a party challenges the constitutionality of a county or municipal ordinance 
in an action in which the county or municipal attorney has not appeared, the party 
raising the question of constitutionality shall notify the county or municipal 
attorney of such fact. The court shall permit the county or municipality to be heard 
upon timely application. 
(d)(3) Failure of a party to provide notice as required by this rule is not a waiver of 
any constitutional challenge otherwise timely asserted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 30, 2009 the State of Utah, as represented by officials on the Utah 
County Attorneys Office, filed an in rem petition with the court pursuant to provisions of 
§77-38a-601, Utah Code 2009, to preserve certain properties in anticipation of an order of 
restitution being entered in a future criminal case against persons appearing to have an 
interest in the properties (R. 9).1 In order to identify persons appearing to have an interest 
in the properties sought to be preserved, the Appellant researched the properties through 
public records (R. 33: 9-24; R. 1771: 25, 12-15). Evidentiary hearing on the petition was 
held on October 14, 2009, Honorable Fred D. Howard presiding. On October 21,2009, 
the court entered restraining orders to the persons appearing to have an interest in the 
1
 The trial court sua sponte changed the caption from an en rem action against 
certain properties to its present form which lists those identified by the State to have an 
interest in the properties to be preserved as defendants. 
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properties (Defendants), prohibiting them from selling, damaging, transferring or 
otherwise disposing of assets identified in the petition (R. 135; R. 139; R. 143; R. 147; R. 
151). On February 10, 2010, Appellee filed a motion to lift the restraining order (R. 234), 
and the State filed its response in opposition to the motion on March 4, 2010 (R. 277), 
and also a motion to strike the Appellee's motion based upon various reasons, a primary 
one being that Intervenor was not a party in the action (R. 273). After the filing of 
various other pleadings, the Appellee filed a motion to formally intervene in the case on 
April 14, 2010 (R. 573). On April 23, 2010, The Appellant responded in opposition to the 
motion (R. 817). Oral arguments were entertained by the court on April 27, 2010, 
Honorable Fred D. Howard, presiding. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellee's 
motion to intervene was granted, and Intervenor was requested to submit a written order 
thereon (R. 1771: 44, 21-46, 22). On May 3, 2010 Intervenor filed its proposed order 
with the court2. On May 6, 2010 the State filed an objection to Intervenor's proposed 
order, and contemporaneously therewith filed a proposed alternative order with the court 
(R. 867: 5-6). On June 11, 2010 the Court, Honorable Fred D. Howard, issuing, entered a 
written order of its own drafting (R. 993, Addendum #1). The State timely appealed (R. 
2
 Appellant's counsel could not find this document in the record, nor in its case 
file, and therefore refers the court to R. 867: 3, wherein Appellant recites for the trial 
court the Appellee's proposed order's rudimentary provisions: "[T]he Court hereby 
ORDERS: 1. Money & More Investors, LLC's Motion to Intervene is GRANTED; 2. Money & 
More Investors, LLC is entitled to intervene pursuant to Rules 24(a) and 24(b) of' the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; and 3. Money & More Investors, LLC shall be a third-party plaintiff in this 
matter." 
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993), to the Utah Court of Appeals, however, the appeal was transferred to the Utah 
Supreme (R. 1314). The State challenges the trial court's order (R. 993, Addendum #1) 
granting Intervenor intervention into this asset preservation action under Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which includes a conclusion of law that the notice 
provisions of §78-38a-601 violate due process provisions of the Constitution of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
In December of 2008, Investigators associated with the Utah County Attorney's Office 
began investigating a multi-million dollar fraudulent investments scheme which involved the 
defendants after receiving a report on the matter from a person who invested therein. The 
investigation revealed that the period in which the defendants were operating the fraudulent 
scheme was generally between June of 2007 and November of 2008. The fraudulent conduct was 
also participated in by other individuals which could be described as secondary-level suspects, or 
persons directly engaged in the fraudulent scheme but further down line in it from the defendants. 
The fraud can be generally described as a ponzi investment scheme, but with a pyramid-
type promotion kick-back component. This kick-back variation immediately pays to those who 
have previously invested in the scheme, a negotiated percentage of all investment funds received 
into the fraudulent scheme by their individual solicitations of funds from other unsuspecting 
investors, usually their friends, neighbors, and other personal or business associates, one or more 
3
 Despite Appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing, no evidentiary hearing 
was held on Appellee's motion to intervene. Therefore, all facts presented are drawn from 
the State's original petition to preserve assets (R. 9) and Officer Richard Hales's affidavit 
in support of the petition (R. 33). Other facts may be found in Appellee's proffer during 
the April 27,2010 hearing on the motion to intervene (R. 1771: 3,10-5,25). 
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of the investors not being accredited investors. There was no product, material, or other item 
associated with the exchange of funds in this fraudulent scheme, it was purely a money 
investment scheme with a promise of hefty returns and solicitation kick-backs. The investment 
solicitation "pitch" was based in the invested monies being used to fund a new on-line, short-
term loan, operation by Defendant Gale Robinson's California based business named "Money 
and More." 
The investigation shows that the value of funds received from defrauded investors ranges 
between 40 - 59 million dollars, with approximately 90 percent of the victims/investors residing 
in Utah County, and approximately an equal percentage of the total dollar amount obtained in the 
fraudulent scheme also coming from those Utah County victims/investors. None of the 
participants in the fraudulent scheme, whether principle or secondary-level suspects, were 
licensed to deal in the offer, sale, or promotion of securities. None of the securities offered for 
sale, or sold, in the fraudulent scheme were register with the Utah Division of Securities, nor 
qualified for any statutory exemption from registration. 
Defendants solicited investments and worked closely with secondary-level investors in 
Utah County, receiving their invested funds into the scheme, instructing them in setting up their 
own Limited Liability Companies, training them to assist others in setting up their own Limited 
Liability Companies, assisting them in soliciting others for investment funds, and receiving 
money from them as they received investment funds from investors further down-line in the 
scheme's structure. 
The vast majority of the funds derived from the unlawful scheme were either retained by 
three of the principle defendants, or sent further up-line to the fourth principle, Ms. Gale 
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Robinson. Only a small portion of the funds were returned to the investors in the form of kick-
back payments or dividend/interest payment on their investments while the fraudulent scheme 
was in full operation. The matter came to light when a mid-level investor stopped receiving 
anticipated monthly dividend payments, and soon thereafter, reported the matter to authorities. 
This reporting investor invested $100,000.00 in the fraudulent scheme, and received only a few 
monthly dividend or interest payments before the fraudulent scheme collapsed. Investigation into 
the financial dealings of the defendants brought into question the purchase, payment(s) towards 
purchase, or the pay off, of certain real and personal properties with funds received by them from 
the fraudulent scheme they were operating. Clear evidence was found in financial records, that 
funds from defrauded investors were used to either purchase, make payment(s) towards the 
purchase, or pay off, real and personal properties sought to be preserved in the asset 
preservation action. 
For Court and document efficiency, the Appellant refers the Court to its Summary 
of Proceedings Below, supra, for the remainder of this Summary of Facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is the Appellant's position that the trial court erred in its granting of Intervenor's 
motion to intervene under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure into an asset 
preservation action brought by the State under §77-38a-601, Utah Code Annotated. The 
trial court failed to properly evaluate application of Rule 24 to the matter before it, and 
further, it also miscarried correct analysis of Article L, §7 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah and its application to the action. 
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Pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court is 
required to make findings that (1) the "applicant [has] an interest relating to the property 
or transaction which is the subject of the action," (2) the applicant "is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest," and (3) "the applicant's interest is [not] adequately represented by existing 
parties." Id. The trial court failed to undertake such an analysis, and failed to enter 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law of such in its granting Appellee's 
intervention into the asset preservation action. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court is 
required to make findings (1) that "applicant's claim or defense and the main action have 
a question of law or fact in common," and (2) "[i]n exercising its discretion the court shall 
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the 
rights of the original parties." Id. The trial court failed to undertake such an analysis, and 
failed to enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law of such in its granting 
Appellee's intervention into the asset preservation action. 
As part of its Order allowing Appellee intervention into the asset protection action, 
the trial court sua sponte entered conclusions of law that §77-38a-601, Utah Code 
Annotated, violates the due process provisions of Article I., §7 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, without per se declaring the statute unconstitutional (R. 993, Addendum 
#1). The constitutionality of §77-38a-601 was not raised by Appellant or Appellee in 
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written memoranda in opposition to (See generally, R. 817) or in support of (See 
generally R. 573 & R. 802) the motion to intervene, though Appellee did make an 
argument that it was "a person appearing to have an interest in the property" (§77-3 8a-
601(2)(a)) and the Appellant committed error in not serving notice of the asset protection 
action on it as required under notice provisions of §77-38a-601. The trial court raised the 
specific question/issue regarding the constitutionality of §77-38a-601, sua sponte during 
oral argument by Appellant's counsel in opposition to the motion to intervene (R. 1771: 
18, 25-19, 17). In raising the issue, the trial court failed to undertake appropriate 
constitutional analysis of the question, and failed to enter specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of such in its granting Appellee's intervention into the asset 
preservation action unconstitutional (R. 993, Addendum #1). 
The trial court's failure to appropriately analyze the Appellee's motion to intervene 
under provisions of the Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Article L, §7 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, resulted in it committing error when it granted the 
Appellee's intervention into the asset protection action. 
ARGUMENTS 
The trial court should have denied Appellee's motion to intervene. First, Appellee 
does not have a right to intervene under Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Second, Appellee is not entitled to permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Finally, the trial court erred in concluding that 77-38a-601 violates 
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constitutional mandates. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLEE HAD A 
RIGHT TO INTERVENE UNDER RULE 24(A), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Rule 24(a) states: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: 
(1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when 
the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which 
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-38a-601 does not confer an unconditional right to 
intervene. Therefore, Appellee is left with Subsection (2) to allow intervention. Under 
Subsection (2), 
An applicant must be allowed to intervene if four requirements are met: 1) 
the application is timely; 2) the applicant has an interest in the subject 
matter of the dispute; 3) that interest is or may be inadequately represented; 
and 4) the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action. 
Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah 1997) (citing Lima, 657 P.2d 279, 282 
(Utah 1982)). A trial court's grant of intervention of right, pursuant to rule 24(a) is 
subject to a de novo standard of review. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, If 16, 1 
P.3d 1074. 
In this matter, Appellee did not timely file its Motion to intervene; Appellee did 
not have an interest in the subject matter of the dispute; Appellee failed to show that its 
interest was not adequately represented by the parties; and while Appellee would be 
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bound by judgment in the action, its interest in the property, if any, would not be affected 
as a result of the judgment. 
A. Appellee did not timely file its motion to intervene. 
First, Appellee did not timely file its motion to intervene. 
Generally, the cases hold that intervention is not to be permitted after entry 
of judgment. The courts are reluctant to make exceptions to the general rule 
and do so only upon a strong showing of entitlement and justification, or 
such unusual or compelling circumstances as will justify the failure to seek 
intervention earlier. Postjudgment intervention is looked upon with disfavor 
by reason of the tendency thereof to prejudice the rights of existing parties 
and the undue interference it has upon the orderly processes of the court. 
Jenner v. Real Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1983) (Citations omitted). 
Here, the trial court had already had an evidentiary hearing and issued its 
restraining order prior to Appellee's motion to intervene (R. 135; R. 139; R. 143; R. 147; 
R. 151). If Appellee is allowed to intervene, Appellant and the trial court will be required 
to revisit the evidentiary hearing regarding the propriety of the restraining order. Appellee 
did not make a "strong showing of entitlement and justification" or "compelling 
circumstances." Appellant provided the required notice of the proceedings to record 
owners, lien holders and those appearing to have an interest in the property (R. 41; R. 42; 
R. 43; R. 44; R. 45; R. 46). Appellee was not entitled to notice of the proceedings as it did 
not have an interest in the property at the time of the hearing. Moreover, the State was 
investigating (and still is) many of the Appellee's constituents, not as victims who lost 
property in the criminal conduct associated with the property at issue, but as co-
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conspirators, co-defendants, and accomplices of criminal actions directly connected to 
the ponzi scheme (R. 273: 14-15). 
Because Appellee did not file before the restraining order was issued, it's motion 
was not timely. 
B. Appellee did not demonstrate an interest in the subject matter 
Second, Appellee did not demonstrate an interest in the subject matter. "To justify 
intervention, the party seeking intervention must demonstrate a direct interest in the 
subject matter of the litigation such that the intervenor's rights may be affected, for good 
or for ill." Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1982). 
[The required] interest does not include a mere, consequential, remote or 
conjectural possibility of being in some manner affected by the result of the 
original action. It must be such a direct claim upon the subject matter of the 
action that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct operation of the 
judgment to be rendered. 
Id. (Quoting State v. Craig, Mo. App., 364 S.W.2d 343 (1963)). 
In this case, Appellee does not have an interest in the property at issue. Appellee 
held no financial lien on any of the defendant property, nor ownership interest in the 
properties at the time this action was commenced (R. 1771: 5, 17-23; 26,4-16; 27, 
15-30,9; 34,2-23; 37, 8-38,2. R. 237: 21-22), nor does it now. No evidence of 
Appellee's interest in the property was ever received by the trial court. And despite the 
fact that the court understood and questioned the contingent nature of Appellee's interest 
in the defendant properties (R. 1771: 30,22-31, 8), it held that Appellee was entitled to 
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intervention under Rule 24(a). Therefore, the trial court's grant of intervention of right 
should be reversed. Moreover, any interest Appellee has in the property is indirect or 
consequential: it depends on the trial court's acceptance and approval of a settlement 
agreement between Mr. Bosch and Mr. Benson and Appellee, which was reached as part 
of a civil action in the Federal Court (R. 237: 21-22). 
Appellant notes that Appellee purports to have obtained an interest in the property 
at issue. If Appellee did obtain such an interest from the defendants, it was in violation of 
the trial court's restraining order (R. 1771: 27,15-30,9). The restraining order in this 
matter was issued on October 21, 2009. On January 30, 2010, certain defendants 
transferred their property to Appellee. Therefore, the alleged transfer was solicited, 
negotiated, entered into, and effectuated in direct violation of the trial court's Restraining 
Order. The State maintains that any property transfer relied upon by Appellee to give it an 
interest or claim in this matter was obtained in violation of the court's order, and therefore 
fraudulent, and void (R. 1771: 27,15-30,9). 
Furthermore, the victim's rights statute does not grant Appellee an interest in the 
property so as to enable it to intervene. 
L Appellee is not a "victim" in this matter and has no interest in the 
property at issue. 
The term "victim" is not found in Section 77-3 8a-601. Nor is there any provision 
in the statute allowing the court to make any finding of who, or whom, might fill such a 
roll in this asset protection case. Therefore, the fact that Appellee's membership is 
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comprised of other LLCs whose members are purportedly "victims," is of no consequence 
in the matter before the bar. The single purpose of this type of action is found in the 
statute - to preserve assets in anticipation of an order of restitution being entered in a 
criminal case. 
iL Utah Code §77-37-1, et seq.. does not grant Appellee an interest in the 
property at issue. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-38-1, etseq., does not support granting Appellee 
standing int his matter. Section 77-37-1, et seq., clearly shows that it applies only to 
properly filed criminal cases, and therefore is inapplicable to this civil en rem action. 
Examples of this are: 
1. §77-37-1(1): indicates that "[t]he Legislature recognizes the duty of victims and 
witnesses of crime to fully and voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and 
prosecutorial agencies . . . ." 
2. §77-37-2(3): defines "Victim" as a "person against whom a crime has allegedly 
been committed . . . " 
3. §77-37-3(l)(a): directs that "[vjictims and witnesses have a right to be informed 
as to the level of protection from intimidation and harm available to them . . . as 
they participate in criminal justice proceedings . . . . " 
4. §77-37-3(l)(h): states that "[vjictims and witnesses . . . should have a speedy 
disposition of the entire criminal justice process. All involved public agencies . . . 
encourage speedy disposition of criminal cases." 
5. §77-37-5(6): holds that "[t]he person accused of and subject to prosecution for 
the crime or the act which would constitute a crime ... has no standing to make a 
claim concerning any violation " (Emphasis added.) 
Appellee is not a party to this civil matter, and there is not any provision under 
Utah Code §77-37-1, et seq., or case law interpreting any of its provisions, which allows 
it to be viewed or accepted as a party therein. At the trial court, Appellee cited to §77-37-
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3(l)(e), which holds that "[v]ictims may seek restitution or reparations, including medical 
costs . . . " as a basis for their motion, yet this provision does not authorize it to intervene 
or interfere with this civil matter, not only from a substantive legal authority basis, but 
also from the mere fact that it does not apply to this matter before the bar. A corollary 
statute to §77-37-3(l)(e) is §77-38a-403 which directs that no provision of the part can 
"limit or impair the right of the person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue 
and recover damages in a civil action...." However, just as §77-37-3(l)(e), this 
provision does not provide any basis in law for Appellee to become a party via 
intervention in this matter. 
iii. Utah Code §77-38-1. et seq.* does not grant Appellee an interest in the 
property. 
Similarly Utah Code §77-38-1, et seq., does not grant Appellee an interest in the 
property at issue. Section 77-38-1, et seq., clearly shows that it applies only to properly 
filed, prosecuted and resolved (either by entry of plea or conviction at trial) criminal 
cases. Examples of this are: 
1. §77-38-2(5): defines "Important Criminal Justice Hearings" as specified 
proceedings in a "felony criminal case[]." 
2. §77-38-2(9)(a): defines "Victim of berime" as a "natural person against whom 
the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated . . . " 
3. §77-38-3(1): states that "[w]ithin seven days of the filing of felony criminal 
charges against a defendant..." 
4. §77-38-3(2): holds that "[t]he initial notice to the victim of a crime ..." 
5. §77-38-4(l)(a)-{c) directs that "[t]he victim of a crime shall have the rightf] to 
be present at the important criminal... hearings," "heard at the important criminal 
... hearings," and "submit a written statement in any action on appeal related to 
that crime " (Emphasis added.) 
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There is not any provision under Utah Code §77-38-1, etseq., which allows 
Appellee to be viewed or accepted as a party in this matter through intervention therein. 
According to Utah Code §77-38-2(9)(a) a "' Victim of a crime5 means a natural 
person against whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated . . 
." And §77-38a-102(14)(a), indicates that a "' Victim' means any person whom the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities." However, §77-38a-102(14)(b) places a direct limitation on those who the 
court can determine to be victims in a criminal case. It holds that a "'Victim may not 
include a codefendant or accomplice." 
The business entities Appellee represents were created for criminal activity 
proposes, and 70% of Appellee's listed members are currently under suspicion of being 
involved in the ponzi scheme at some level (R. 273: 14-15). Applying this fact to the 
statutory definitions of "victim," it seems that Appellee's members, without more, cannot 
be found victims of criminal misconduct, thus qualifying them to receive any restitution 
upon resolution of the anticipated criminal case(s). 
Additionally, as the statutory scheme of victim definitions clearly sets forth it 
being of an individual nature, it would appear that for the court to grant Appellee's 
motion, the trial court would have to hold an evidentiary hearing in which each of the 
purported three hundred-thirty (330) individuals forming the membership base of 
Appellee present themselves and be questioned by the court, and Appellant. Yet, despite 
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Appellant's request, no such evidentiary hearing was held here. 
iv. Utah Code §77-38a-601 does not grant Appellee an interest in the 
property. 
This matter was brought before the trial court as a civil en rem proceeding brought 
by the State of Utah (Plaintiff) against certain real and personal property (defendant 
properties), pursuant to, and governed by, provisions of Utah Code §77-38a-601. 
Pursuant to that section, and also Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
only parties in interest recognized in the case before the bar are (1) the State of Utah, (2) 
the specified defendant properties, and (3) the persons appearing to have an interest in the 
defendant properties, as identified by Appellant and given formal notice of the action. 
And §77-3 8a-102(5) of the Crime Victims Restitution Act is more restrictive, directing 
that for purposes of restitution in criminal matters, a "Party" means "the prosecutor, 
defendant, or department involved in a prosecution." 
Appellee is not a "person appearing to have an interest in the property." It held no 
financial lien on any of the defendant property, nor ownership interest in the defendant 
property at the time this action was commenced. When Appellant began this action, it 
sought through public and private records as best it could to determine the person(s) 
appearing to have an interest in the property were. Appellee was not located in any 
documents or files investigated, neither were any of the forty-nine (49) LLCs which it 
indicates it represents, nor any the names of the purported 330 individuals it purportedly 
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represents. Stated plainly and simply, Appellee, nor any of the LLCs, nor any of the 330 
individuals, had any interest whatsoever in the matter, nor do they lawfully today. 
In addition to the fact that Utah Code §77-38a-601 does not grant Appellee any 
authority to intervene into this civil matter, it also does not grant the trial court power to 
determine who victims are or might be, their interest in a respective portion of the 
property encumbered, or how property encumbered pursuant to its provisions will be 
partitioned, as part of this action, and most certainly does not grant to a non-party the 
authority to do so. 
Utah Code §77-38a-601 grants the court power to act upon a pre-conviction 
petition from the prosecuting entity, and either deny the petition, or to (l)(a) "enter a 
temporary restraining order, an injunction, or both", (b) "require the execution of a 
satisfactory performance bond", or (c) "take any other action to preserve the availability 
of property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order." Nowhere 
in §77-38a-601 is found authority, as collocated in §§77-38a-301-302(l), which 
incorporate §77-3 8a-102(14), and which are applicable only to a filed and resolved 
criminal case for the court to make and enter findings of the identities of victims and their 
interests in restitution. 
Despite Appellee's suggestion that the trial court has authority to determine 
possible victims in a yet-to-be-filed criminal case, no such authority is found in any part 
of §§77-38a-301 et seq., nor §77-3 8a-601 supporting such. The power is only granted to 
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the court, after receiving victim information from the prosecuting entity and/or Adult 
Probation and Parole (§§77-38a-202-203) in a filed and resolved criminal case. To hold 
otherwise would negate the proceedings involved in the criminal case which are designed 
to identify victims, determine restitution, and preserve the rights of victims of a crime. To 
require these determinations prior to filing a criminal case would negate the purpose of an 
asset preservation suit: to protect the assets during investigation and prosecution of a 
crime - which in a ponzi-scheme type case, such as the one at bar, requires extensive 
investigation, resources, and time. 
C. Appellant adequately represented Appellee's purported interest. 
"Adequacy of representation generally turns on whether there is an identity or 
divergence of interest between the potential intervenor and an original party and on 
whether that interest is diligently represented." Lima, 657 P.3d at 283 (citing AIsbach v. 
Bader, Mo. App., 616 S.W.2d 147, 151 (1981)). Appellee has the burden to show that 
representation of its interest by existing parties was inadequate. Beacham v. Fritzi Realty 
Corp., 2006 UT App 35. "Regardless of the reason necessitating intervention, a 
'prospective intervenor[]... must give specific reasons why an existing party's 
representation is not adequate.5" Id. (Quoting San Juan County v. United States, 420 F.3d 
1197,1212). 
Appellee made no such showing here (R. 1771: 39,19-41,23). Moreover, 
Appellant adequately represents Appellee's purported interest in the property at issue. 
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Appellant has acted to preserve the property and protect it from being destroyed or 
transferred. Appellant is represented by counsel and the very filing of the asset 
preservation suit demonstrates Appellant's intent to preserve the property. Moreover, 
Appellant will preserve the property without charge to the victims in the criminal case 
associated with the property. Because of this fact, again, a greater portion of the 
restitution will find its way into the hands of the true victims. The preserved properties 
are best left under the Court's control pending the outcome of the various criminal cases 
which have been filed. 
While the property may depreciate during the time it takes to prosecute the 
criminal case, the interest in preserving the property for all persons which can be 
determined to be true victims, and not just those represented by Appellee, outweighs the 
interest in protecting the assets from depreciation. 
D. Although Appellee may be bound by the trial court's judgment, such 
judgment will not prejudice Appellee and is necessary to preserve the 
rights of victims of crime. 
The judgment granting Appellant's restraining order does bind Appellee as it will 
not be able to acquire or sell the subject property until the restraining order is lifted. 
However, because the property will ultimately be released to the true victims of the 
criminal case as restitution, Appellee, if its assertion that it represent the victims in the 
criminal case is true, will receive its fair share of the restitution ordered by the trial court 
in the criminal case. Therefore, although Appellee is bound by the trial court's order, it is 
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not prejudiced by it. In fact, the trial court's restraining order is the only way to preserve 
the property until Appellant is able to discover and present evidence of the identity of the 
true victims in the criminal case. On the other hand, allowing an applicant to intervene in 
an asset preservation suit where there are a multitude of possible victims in the criminal 
case associated with it, risks that applicant gaining access to the subject property which 
other victims do not have. For this reason, the statutory scheme should be followed and 
the identity of the true victims should be determined in the criminal case, and after it has 
been resolved. 
2. APPELLEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION 
UNDER RULE 24(B), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 24(b) states, 
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) 
when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's 
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... 
In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will 
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
(Emphasis added). "A trial court's grant of intervention pursuant to rule 24(b) involves 
the discretion of the trial court," and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Utah State Dept 
ofSoc. Serv. v. Carlson, 924 P.2d 882, (Utah 1996). In this case, the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting Appellee permissive intervention. 
First, as discussed above, Appellee's motion to intervene was not timely because 
the matter had already been adjudicated when Appellee moved to intervene. 
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Second, Appellee's claim or defense and the main action did not have a question 
of law or fact in common. At the time the restraining order was issued, Appellee did not 
have any interest in the property at issue (R. 1771: 5, 17-23; 26, 4-16; 27, 15-30, 9; 34, 
2-23; 37, 8-38, 2. R. 237: 21-22). It was not until after the restraining order was issued 
that Appellee's constituents transferred their interest in the property to Appellee. See 
Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101, 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
that where applicants had no interest in the property at issue in the main action, "they also 
have no basis for their claim that they have a question of law or fact in common with the 
main action"). Moreover, the questions of fact and law (i.e., whether Appellee's 
constituents have an interest in the property and whether they are victims under the law), 
are not at issue in the asset preservation suit. These issues are more appropriately 
adjudicated at the conclusion of the criminal proceeding, as provided for in the victim's 
rights statute. Therefore, appellee had no question of fact or law in common with the 
main action. 
Third, the Court abused its discretion by failing consider whether the intervention 
would "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." 
See Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, % 7,989 P.2d 1073 (shall generally create a mandatory 
obligation) (R. 1771: 43,10-44,1). In addition, by causing Appellant to readdress the 
restraining order after it had already been granted, the granting of permissive intervention 
unduly delayed and prejudiced the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
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3. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO 
MAKE APPROPRIATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYZE OF §77-38A-6019 
YET ENTERED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT THE STATUTE 
OPERATES IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS 
REQUIREMENTS IN ITS ORDER GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION 
TO INTERVENE. 
The trial court based its ruling granting intervention largely on a legal conclusion 
that §77-38a-601 operates in violation of constitutional due process provision (R. 1771: 
44, 21-46, 21. R. 993. Addendum #1) Appellant argues that this was an erroneous 
conclusion of law, and therefore, the trial court clearly abused its discretion. 
The constitutionality, and even the interpretation, of §77-38a-601 is an issue of 
first impression. Legislative enactments are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, 
State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f^ 8, 84 P.3d 1171, and when addressing the constitution-
ality of a statute, the Court is to presume that the statute is constitutional, and resolves any 
reasonable doubts in favor thereof. State v Morrison, 2001 UT 73, f 5, 31 P.3d 547. 
(Citing State v Lopes, 1999 UT 24, \ 6, 980 P.2d 191)). And when reviewing the 
construction of statutes, the general rule is that statutes, where possible, are to be 
construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. Midvale City Corp. v Haltom, 2003 UT 
26,f24,73P.3d334. 
While it is true that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving its 
citizens of property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1, and the 
Utah Constitution requires due process of law before the State may deprive a person of 
his property, Utah Const, art. I, §7., the reviewing court must follow an appropriate 
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analytical approach to the question. That constitutional analysis generally includes the 
following analytical elements: (1) the presumption of constitutionality (See, MacGuire, 
Morrison, and Lopes, Id, supra); (2) the standing of the challenger (See, Heideman v 
Washington City, 2007 UT App. 11); (3) the facts; (4) the statute's construction (See5 
State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, 63 P.3d 621 (Utah 2002); (5) case law precedence; and, (6) 
severability (See, Midvale City Corp., Id., and Gallivan v Walker, 2002 UT 89, 54 P.3d 
1069 (Utah 2002). It requires that the reviewing court consider all the foregoing elements 
and then render specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as part of its order, 
whether upholding or striking-down the statute. 
This Court has held that "the district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an 
erroneous conclusion of law to come to its decision." Taylor-West Weber Water 
Improvement Dist V. Olds, 2009 UT 86, ^  3, 224 P.3d 709 (Utah 2009). 
In the matter before the bar, the trial court failed to properly analyze §77-38a-601 
in relation to constitutional due process requirements. In its ruling (R. 1771: 44, 21-46, 
21) and order (R. 993: 1-2, Addendum #1), the trial court simply entered two conclusions 
of law which were arrived at without proper constitutional analysis. In essence, the trial 
court held that §77-38a-601 operates in violation of constitutional due process require-
ments, without actually finding that the statute is unconstitutional. This is error, and a 
clear showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial court as it considered Appellee's 
motion to intervene, as a "district court abuses its discretion when it relies on am 
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erroneous conclusion of law to come to its decision" Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement 
Dist. V. Olds, Id. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
trial court's granting of the Appellee's motion to intervene under Rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and its conclusion of law that §78-38a-601, Utah Code 2009, operates in 
violation of the due process provisions of the Constitution of Utah, and to remand the matter 
back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's ruling. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of December, 2010. 
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
CURTIS L. LARSON 
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM #1 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
.-ApifllLM Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LARRY 0. BOSH, JERRY A. BOSH, DAVID 
SHAWN BENSON, and CLARENCE D. 
BENSON, 
| Defendants. 
ORDER RE: Hearing on April 27, 
Case No. 090403630 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
2010 
This matter comes before the Court on an objection to the proposed Order regarding the 
April 27, 2010 hearing. Based on the objection and upon review of both proposed Orders, this Court 
enters the following Conclusions of law and Order: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The asset protection statute is designed to preserve assets for a valid reason and purpose, but 
affects the property rights of persons who are not given notice in violation of the 
requirements of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
2. An individual who learns that his property has become the subject of an injunction order 
without notice has the right to intervene and to participate because it affects his fundamental 
right under the constitution of the State of Utah that his porperty not be seized or taken 
1 
without due process. 
The statute does not define who constitutes a victim or who constitutes the perpetrator of the 
criminal act. 
The rights provided by the Constitution of the State of Utah have an overriding effect on the 
statute. 
Money & Moore is granted permissive intervention in accordance with U.R.C.P. 24(b). 
Money & Moore is granted intervention of right in accordance with U.R.C.P. 24(a). 
ORDER 
The Court Order's that Money & Moore LLC's motion to intervene is granted. 
DATED this // day of June, 2010. 
BY THE COURT 
H ^ Fred D. toward | 
District Court Judge 
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